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LAWYER-POLITICIANS IN NEW ENGLAND: 

AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICS AND 

PRACTICES 

CLYDE D. McKEE, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Life and law must be kept 
closely in touch, as you 
can't adjust life to law 
you must adjust law to 
life. 
The only point in having law 
is to make life work. 
Otherwise there will be 
explosions. I 
-Arnold Toynbee 
The practice of law and the practice of politics are both compat­
ible and incompatible. This paradox is illustrated by the life of 
Daniel Webster, one of this nation's most famous and influential 
lawyers. John F. Kennedy, in his Profiles In Courage, wrote, 
"Daniel Webster is familiar to many of us as the battler for Jabez 
Stone's soul against the devil in Stephen Vincent Benet's story. But 
in his own life time, he had many battles against the devil for his 
own soul-and some he lost."2 
• Associate Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, Hartford Connecticut; 
Past President, American Society for Public Administration, Connecticut Chapter; Past 
Chairman, New England Regional Conference of ASPA; Member, Executive Council of 
The New England Political Science Association; Author of PERSPECTIVES OF A STATE 
LEGISLATURE: THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1980); Author of CONNECTI­
CUT, A POLITICAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, NEW ENGLAND POLITICAL PARTIES (1983); 
Dr. McKee has also written more than two dozen articles and professional papers dealing 
with state and local politics in New England. Valuable assistance in the preparation of 
this article was given by Robert Salad, a third-year law student at Western New England 
College School of Law and a Senior Staff Member of the Western New England Law 
Review, and Elaine J. Garrahy, Secretary for the Political Science Department at Trinity 
College. 
I. J. BRAUDE, COMPLETE SPEAKER'S AND TOASTMASTER'S LIBRARY, REMARKS OF 
FAMOUS PEOPLE 59 (1965). 
2. J. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 53 (Giant Cardinal ed. 1960). 
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Kennedy described Webster as "undoubtedly the most talented 
figure in our Congressional history,"3 but he also wrote that he "was 
not as great as he 100ked."4 He could see nothing improper in writ­
ing to the President of the Bank of the United States-at the very 
time when the Senate was engaged in debate over a renewal of the 
Bank's Charter-noting that "my retainer has not been received or 
refreshed as usual."5 Although lawyers can take pride in the fact 
that the ethical standards of the legal profession have progressed sig­
nificantly since Chief Justice John Marshall delivered Marbury v. 
Madison ,6 lawyer-politicians still have serious problems related to 
conflicts of interest. The devil-battling dilemma-to identify the line 
separating proper legal conduct from improper conduct and to pre­
vent political opportunities from forcing the lawyer to cross it-·is as 
real today as it was nearly two centuries ago. 
Robert Leuci, the former New York City policeman who in­
spired the movie Prince of the City, accused New York's lawyers, 
prosecutors, and judges, of corruption. In a presentation at Western 
New England College School of Law he warned law students: "An 
erosion process begins that attacks your integrity, your morality. 
Many times you're going to have to make decisions about what you 
are and who you are."7 
This article has several objectives. First, it will show the affinity 
between the practice of law and politics. Next, it will use three New 
England states-Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts-to 
describe opportunities for lawyers who are also interested in politics. 
Attention will be given to the Code of Professional Responsibility of 
the American Bar Association, the conflicts of interest statutes in 
three states, and how these laws and the opinions of bar associations 
and ethics commissions have influenced the policies of law firms 
serving these areas. The closing section is designed for those inter­
ested in improving legal ethics or making law and politics more 
compatible. 
I. THE AFFINITY BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 
Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth century French aristocrat 
who perceptively analyzed the political culture of the United States, 
3. Id 
4. Id at 54. 
5. Id at 54-55. 
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
7. LeVick, Ex-police Corruption Figure Warns ofErosion ofMorals, The Hartford 
Courant, Jan. 20, 1983, at 42. 
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wrote, "If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I 
sh'ould reply without hesitation . . . that it occupies the judicial 
bench and the bar . . . scarcely any political question arises in the 
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
question."8 One of the earliest examples of both the affinity of law 
and politics and the lawyer as aristocrat is found in the metamorpho­
sis of Connecticut from plantation to colony.9 Trinity College Pro­
fessor Glenn Weaver observed that Connecticut's Fundamental 
Orders "was largely the work of Roger Ludlow of Windsor, the only 
man in the river towns with training in law."10 
Stimson Bullitt, author of To Be a Politician, II is a lawyer-poli­
tician, who twice ran for Congress. Bullitt further illustrated de Toc­
queville's insight when he wrote, 
. . . if politics is one's main interest, law is a good home base. 
Although this factor is overrated, a legal background is a help in 
the performance of a politician's job because the work experience 
of a lawyer, even a specialist, covers such a wide variety of knowl­
edge in his community.12 
Bullitt also saw law as "a castle which one can leave for a venture in 
politics."13 He quotes Henry Stimson, who spent many years mov­
ing from the practice of law to the service of national government 
and then back to law, "I always felt that I remained a lawyer with a 
law firm waiting as a home behind me, to which I could return on 
the completion of my public task and where I could always find 
awaiting my genial friends and collaborators in the law."14 But Bul­
litt saw, in his own practice of law and politics, the same dangers that 
confronted Daniel Webster. 15 Interviews by the author with young 
and old lawyers, political reporters, legislative administrators, and' 
those responsible for policing legal practices and advising lawyers 
revealed that the problems faced by the New England lawyer who 
engages in politics both directly and indirectly are enduring and fre­
8, I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278, 280 (1945). 
9. G. WEAVER, AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT'S CAPITAL 18 (1982). 
10. Id. at 19. Historian John Fiske called the Fundamental Orders, which Con­
necticut claims as its initial constitution, "the first written constitution known to history 
that created a government" and wrote that "it marked the beginning of American democ­
racy." CONNECTICUT STATE REGISTER 53 (1982). 
II. S. BULLITT, To BE A POLITICIAN 13 (1977). 
12. Id. at 13. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 13-14. 
15. Id. 
670 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:667 
quently monumental. I6 
II. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES: WHERE "THE PLUMS" ARE IN 

CONNECTICUT, RHODE ISLAND AND MASSACHUSETTS 

Although the author has been a student of New England's state 
and local governments for the past two decades, the diversity of op­
portunities for lawyer-politicians in the New England states came as 
a surprise. Because the political cultures of such states as Connecti­
cut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts are different, the ways lawyers 
engage in politics are also different. 
A. Connecticut 
Just as a lawyer drafted Connecticut's Fundamental Orders in 
1639, it was Harvard-educated lawyer John M. Bailey who was "the 
architect of modern Connecticut politics."17 Superior Court Judge 
Robert Satter, who experienced many phases of the Connecticut 
lawyer-politician as a local party leader, state legislator, counsel for 
the Democratic Party, and judge, has valuable insights into both 
Connecticut's political culture and the role lawyers have played 
within this culture. 18 Satter shows the way in which lawyer-politi­
cian Bailey dominated Connecticut politics during the period 1946­
1975, masterminding the election of six Democratic governors in 
nine elections. 19 As a local (Hartford), state, and national Demo­
cratic Party chairman (appointed by President Kennedy in 1960), 
Bailey had tremendous influence in the selection of Connecticut's 
judges, prosecutors, clerks, and even the court staff. Bailey had two 
16. During the period of October 1982 to January 1983, the author interviewed, 
either in person or by telephone lawyers, reporters, lobbyists, researchers, prosecutors, 
and the heads of ethics commissions. Some of the lawyers were just beginning their 
careers as attorneys and politicians while others were senior partners on the executive 
committees of major law firms. Although the author would like to give credit to these 
individuals for their contributions to this article, in nearly all instances there was a re­
quest for confidentiality as a condition for candid information. 
17. Satter, Hero Worship and the State We're In, The Hartford Courant, Jan. 9, 
1983, at 9. 
18. Robert Satter is a superior court judge in Connecticut who has had comprehen­
sive experience as a lawyer-politician. He began his career in private practice, served in 
the Connecticut General Assembly as a member of the House for three terms, held the 
position of Legislative Counsel for the Democratic Party for eight years at a time when 
the Democrats controlled the office of governor and both houses of the legislature, and 
was appointed a state judge in 1975. He is also an adjunct professor at the University of 
Connecticut Law School. 
19. Satter, The Role ojthe Legislative Counsel, in PERSPECTIVES OF ASTATE LEGIS­
LATURE 33-40 (c. McKee, Jr., ed. 1980). 
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cornerstones for his political influence. First, he had an understand­
ing with all his Democratic governors that there would be a division 
of authority: the governor would run the state, and Bailey would 
run the party and the patronage system. Second, Bailey, an expert in 
the legislative process, controlled the state senate, which he used to 
block unwanted legislative initiatives.20 Satter describes how Bailey 
used the promise of a judgeship to motivate his service to Connecti­
cut: "Bailey lived to see Ella elected and inaugurated. And one of 
his final acts was to fulfill his promise to me by calling Governor 
Grasso from his hospital bed, when he could hardly speak, to have 
my name put on the list of prospective judges."21 But when John 
Bailey and Governor Grasso died, a new political system evolved in 
Connecticut. As the incentives and rewards system shifted, the op­
portunities for lawyer-politicians also changed. 
Connecticut's political system is becoming democratized, 
professionalized, and, in some areas, nonpartisanized. What this 
means is that lawyers can now use the state's challenge primary law 
to make direct runs for office with or without the endorsement of 
party chairman. They can create their own campaign organizations, 
raise their own funds, get their own supporters to the voting ma­
chines, and let the people decide. If elected, they are relatively free 
to establish their own political priorities and to use personal discre­
tion in selecting staff. Because the governor nominates lawyers for 
judgeships, however, and the judiciary committee (Connecticut uses 
a joint-committee system) screens and approves them, the governor 
and the party's legislative leaders still have significant influence over 
those who aspire to positions within the judiciary.22 One lobbyist, 
who is not a lawyer, but who served several terms as a state legisla-. 
tor, complained bitterly about this motivating feature. He said, "At­
torneys in the legislature are asked to 'check their brains' if they 
want to be judges. I think it is dangerous to require that judges be 
lawyers."23 The trend in Connecticut, however, is towards a more 
professionalization and greater certification. 
Connecticut's General Assembly is a mixture of patronage and 
merit appointments. The personal staff of majority and minority 
20. See C.D. McKEE, JR., Constitutional Principles and Strategies for Controlling 
the Authority of the State, in PERSPECTIVES OF A STATE LEGISLATURE 3-13 (1980). 
21. Satter, Hero Worship and The State We're In, in PERSPECTIVES OF A STATE 
LEGISLATURE 16 (C. McKee, Jr. ed. 1980). 
22. See C.D. McKEE, JR., Connecticut: A Political System in Transition, in NEW 
ENGLAND POLITICAL PARTIES (1983). 
23. See supra note 16. 
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leaders, plus the clerks of committees, are appointed on the basis of 
personal and party loyalty and service. But partisan affiliation can 
be a handicap for those lawyers seeking positions within the research 
components of the legislature. Numerous attorneys are hired on the 
basis of their legal qualifications rather than party connections. 
Similarly, Connecticut's 112 state prosecutors are becoming less 
partisan. They are selected by senior resident judges in each of Con­
necticut's twelve judicial districts rather than by the attorney general 
or the legislature.24 Connecticut's seventeen part-time assistant pros­
ecutors are being phased out. The entry level salaries for deputy 
assistant state's attorneys is $26,000, which is more than most private 
law firms pay for inexperienced associates. The path to one of these 
positions is often through a clerkship for a senior judge rather than 
through service to a party chairman or candidate for elected office. 
The erosion of an "incentive-rewards" system within the major par­
ties has contributed to the decline in their influence in Connecticut. 
Some of the best opportunities for lawyer-politicians in Con­
necticut are at the local level. Near the top is the elected position of 
probate judge. There are 131 probate judges, each with a four-year 
term. Although the requirements for these judgeships are political 
rather than legal (judges do not have to be lawyers), probate judges 
who are attorneys have considerable advantages. They can engage 
in civil and criminal private law practice. Their time is flexible. 
They have high public visibility. Additionally, they can build a net­
work of valuable relationships using their authority to appoint exec­
utors of estates. Probate judgeships are highly stable in that 
incumbents are usually re-elected. In recent years, the probate court 
system has come under strong attack for improprieties, however, by 
The Hariford Courant, Connecticut's largest newspaper.25 
Town counselor director of law is a position that has many of 
the same benefits as probate judge. Most are part-time jobs, with 
flexible schedules, few restrictions on criminal or civil practice, and 
high public visibility. The disadvantages are that these attorneys are 
usually appointed by chief executives, and the positions have no 
fixed terms, and less stability than probate judges. Also, there is a 
24. See supra note 16. Newly-elected Attorney General Joseph Lieberman cam­
paigned to change this provision of the Connecticut Constitution. He wants his office to 
have both civil and criminal jurisdiction with control over the Chief State's Attorney, 
who is now appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Hartford Cou­
rant, July 17, 1983 at B5. 
25. See, e.g., The Hartford Courant, April 14, 1983, at I. 
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trend in some larger cities to remove directors of law from partisan 
politics and to make them full-time, civil service positions. 
Some young attorneys seek appointments as counsel for various 
boards, commissions, and committees. Particularly attractive is 
counsel for the zoning board, hospital board, or economic develop­
ment committee. While these appointments have relatively low visi­
bility, little stability, and limited financial rewards, they offer the 
young lawyer-politician valuable opportunities for knowledge and 
expenence. 
The main attraction for Connecticut lawyers to serve on parti­
san committees at the state and local levels is the opportunity to de­
velop relationships with partisan decision-makers, while running few 
conflicts-of-interest risks that restrict private practice. Similarly, 
lawyers who serve as campaign managers for prominent candidates 
have additional incentives and advantages. A campaign manager 
has a variety of opportunities to develop valuable contacts with the 
heads of organizations in both the public and the private sectors. 
Compared to serving a term of office as an elected or appointed offi­
cial, the period of commitment for a campaign manager is relatively 
short. Because the personal relationship between the candidate and 
his or her manager is often highly personal and frequently intense, 
there is the opportunity for an enduring friendship. If the state party 
chairman is relatively weak and the candidate is an incumbent gov­
ernor, the lawyer-campaign manager can become one of the most 
influential figures in the entire state political system without incur­
ring the responsibilities or restrictions on legal practice that are asso­
ciated with public office. Also, there is widespread perception that 
this lawyer has political influence when practicing before state agen­
cies even though actual influence does not exist. 
B. Rhode Island 
Lincoln Steffens in 1905 called Rhode Island "a state for sale."26 
Duane Lockard, a political scientist at Connecticut College in 1958, 
attempted to explain why this state has a reputation for being politi­
cally corrupt.27 First, he stressed the fact that Rhode Island was a 
one-party Republican state until 1932, when it abruptly went Demo­
cratic. There was considerable corruption under the Republican re­
26. Steffens, Rhode Islanti: A Slale For Sale, 24 MCCLURE'S MAG., 337 (Feb. 
1905). See also D. LOCKARD, NEW ENGLAND STATE POLITICS 172 (1959). 
27. LOCKARD, supra note 26, at 172. 
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gime which established a tradition that the Democrats continued.28 
Next, Lockard stressed the fact that Rhode Island is one of the most 
urbanized states, with half of the population engaged in manufactur­
ing. Equally important was the fact that Rhode Island had "a higher 
proportion of immigrants and their second- and third-generation 
progeny than any other state."29 
Lawyers were very much part of the system Lockard described. 
Republican "boss" Charles Brayton, a civil war general, controlled 
the state legislature and all appointments.30 Lincoln Steffens ob­
served that Brayton controlled Rhode Island's lawyer-legislators by 
using judgeships and law business as incentives and rewards.31 Con­
tributing to the tradition of political corruption, was the practice of 
dual office holding, whereby legislators could accept executive ap­
pointments. There was also the linkage between lawyer-legislators 
and the race-tracks. 
The majority leader of the House, James H. Kiernan, has for 
many years been an attorney for one of the race tracks. One can­
not conclude from this fact alone that the actions of the majority 
leader on race-track issues are influenced thereby, but at the very 
least there would seem to be a serious conflict of interest.32 
Interviews with lawyers, reporters, and state civil employees re­
vealed that although the state has adopted a variety of reforms it still 
has "a different political culture."33 What this means is that while 
Massachusetts pays its state legislators $30,000 per year and Con­
necticut pays its part-time, "citizen" legislators $10,500 and $2,500 
expenses, Rhode Island still has a constitutional provision for paying 
its legislators $300 per year for its short (60 days), four-day week 
sessions. Yet many of the 150 legislators, representing 39 communi­
ties, are lawyers.34 To illustrate, the chart below reveals that attor­
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. According to Lockard, in 1901 Rhode Island passed "The Brayton Law", a 
procedure authorizing the Senate to reject a governor's nomination fo! any office and 
then to substitute its own candidate. Without authority to veto, the governor was without 
the power usurped by Brayton as party boss. Id. at 175. 
31. Id. (citing L. STEFFENS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEFFENS 466 
(1931». 
32. LOCKARD, supra note 26, at 209-10. 
33. This was the phrase used by a state career administrator, who has lived in 
Rhode Island most of his life and is familiar with the politics of the other New England 
states. Id. 
34. Id. 
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ney-Iegislators for the past decade have dominated both the House 
and Senate judiciary committees. 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees Membership35 
House No. of Members No. of Attorneys 
1973-74 17 9 

1975-76 16 8 

1977-78 17 9 

1979-80 17 8 

1981-82 17 6 

Senate No. of Members No. of Attorneys 
1973-74 17 II 

1975-76 15 9 

1977-78 18 7 

1979-80 18 9 

1981-82 16 12 

Rhode Island's structure resembles that of a city-state largely 
because, like Connecticut, it has no county government. This means 
that lawyer-politicians play influential roles at the local levels.36 
There are 39 probate judges and an equal number of city solicitors, 
who are part-timers free to engage in both civil and criminal prac­
tice. Unlike Connecticut's system, both probate judges and city so­
licitors are appointed by the city councils. This means there are 
incentives for lawyers to run for council seats from which they can 
control judicial appointments or advance their own legal-political 
careers.37 It does not seem that the political culture which Lincoln 
Steffens described in 1905 and Lockard analyzed in 1958 has 
changed significantly in Rhode Island. There seems to be considera­
ble acceptance of apparent, if not actual, conflicts of interest by law­
yer-politicians at both the state and locallevels.38 
C. Massachusetts 
Politics in Massachusetts is "big league hard ball" played by 
committed and often talented professionals. Tradition runs deep 
and permeates public institutions at both the state and local levels. 
35. Letter from Eileen Cook to Dr. Clyde D. McKee, Jr. (Jan. 25, 1983). This table 
was constructed by researchers in the Legislative Council on January 25, 1983. Id 
36. See supra note 16. 
37. Id 
38. Id 
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National, state and local officials have statures and reputations 
greater than those in many other states. Obvious are the examples of 
Senator Kennedy and House Speaker O'Neill. Whereas Connecticut 
and Rhode Island have traditions for part-time, citizen-politicians, 
who are paid meager salaries, Massachusetts has the tradition for 
full-time office holders, who are adequately compensated.39 
There is a Brahmin factor in Massachusetts politics which influ­
ences lawyer-politicians. "[I]n some states, family names do not 
mean a great deal; in others, first family, blueblood status has great 
political influence. Probably none of these privileged groups has so 
conspicuous or well-heralded a place as the Boston Brahmins."4o 
The prominence and influence of politically active, old-line families 
has tended to keep political parties weak while contributing to the 
legitimacy and the honor of public service for lawyers in the Com­
monwealth. Lockard saw this when he wrote, "The General Court 
has an air of importance and decorum about it that resembles Con­
gress or the House of Commons more than other state legisla­
tures."41 Lawyers considering practice in Massachusetts are 
confronted with clearer choices than is usually the case in Connecti­
cut or in Rhode Island. 
On the one hand, there is the attraction of the large and prestigi­
ous, downtown Boston law firms. Salaries start at about $35,000 and 
within six or seven years there is an expectation of $70,000-$90,000.42 
On the other hand, there are the political offices. Near the top of the 
list are the ten district attorneys, who are elected for four-year terms 
and who serve as county prosecutors. In addition to having high 
public visibility and substantial authority to appoint assistant prose­
cutors, the office of district attorney can be viewed as an excellent 
location from which to launch a campaign for state-wide office or 
Congress. It may also serve as a fine reentry point into private crimi­
nal practice. Lawyers who fail to gain appointment with one of the 
big Boston firms will sometimes use positions within the attorney 
general's office to gain the specialized experiences and reputations 
they need to win prestigious appointments within the private sector 
on the second attempt.43 
At the local level there are strong incentives for some lawyers to 
39. Id 
40. LOCKARD, supra note 26, at 119. 
41. Id at 148. 
42. This information was supplied by a young Harvard-educated lawyer, who left 
one of these firms for an appointment at the state capitol. See supra note 16. 
43. Id 
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engage in politics to gain advantages in the practice of law. One 
young attorney explained how being a state representative can help 
in the practice of law in a local court. 
State representatives get to know the local judge. They also know 
their way around the court. They know when the calendar of 
cases is backed up. Timing can be a major factor in the practice of 
law. With a continuance, a lawyer can often work out a deal with 
the other side to the advantage of his client.44 
Similarly, a state representative enjoys an advantage in repre­
senting a client who has legislative matters of interest. This is be­
cause the representative clearly enjoys access to state government 
which is of great value to the client, to the extent the access may be 
properly used.45 
III. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST REFORM MOVEMENT 
A. National Guidelines ani'Disciplinary Rules 
On August 12, 1969, the Code of Professional Responsibility 
was adopted as a model of ethical conduct for the nation's attor­
neys.46 The American Bar Association's Special Committee on 
Evaluation of Ethical Standards was appointed to evaluate the Ca­
nons of Professional Ethics, which were first promulgated in 1908. 
The committee identified four shortcomings of the Canons.47 In­
cluded in the shortcomings, was the need to update the Canons to 
keep pace with the changing conditions of our legal system in an 
urbanized society.48 
Recently the Code of Professional Responsibility has become a 
source of concern both from within and outside the bar.49 Height­
ened public criticism of legal ethics in the post-Watergate years has 
helped fuel reform movements. In response, the ABA appointed the 
Special Commission for the Evaluation of Professional Standards on 
August 22, 1977, to review the need for improving the Code.50 The 
new code is currently in the form of a restatement. 51 
44. Id 
45. Id 
46. See generally Reflections on a Decade Under the Code ofProfessional Responsi­
bility: The Need for Riform, 57 N.C. L. REV. 495 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reflections). 
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preface (1979). 
48. Id 
49. Reflections, supra note 47, at 495. 
50. Id 
51. Id at 495-96. 
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While the present Code leaves wide latitude for state and fed­
eral discretion concerning conflicts of interest arising when a lawyer 
is also a public office holder, some policy considerations are mani­
fested by the Code.52 These considerations and the applicable Disci­
plinary Rules and Ethical Considerations will be outlined before an 
analysis is made. Clearly, society benefits by having lawyers serve as 
public officers.53 One ethical consideration provides that lawyers are 
uniquely qualified to make significant contribution in improving the 
legal system. 54 This provision serves also as a warning to public of­
ficeholders to refrain from engaging in activities which are, or for­
see ably could be, in conflict with their official duties as lawyers.55 
An attorney who holds public office must avoid conduct which 
could lead a lay person to conclude that the attorney is using his 
office to further his professional success or personal interest.56 More­
over, such an attorney knows that his conduct is not in the public 
interest.57 Finally, DR 8-101 (A)(2) prohibits an office-holding attor­
ney from using his position to influence or attempting to influence a 
tribunal to take action in his or his client's favor. 58 
The code provisions cited above serve as an outline, albeit a 
general one, for attorneys to follow. Courts have similarly genera­
lized when and how these provisions should be applied. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court in applying DR 8-101(A)(2) stated that: "The 
touchstone of our disciplinary power is to fashion a sanction which 
fulfills our trust to the public and the profession, edifies the bar and 
is fair and just to the respondent."59 
One writer60 commented that, while DR 8-101(A)(1) is a worth­
while and necessary proscription for certain conduct by lawyers who 
are also public officials, it is also an "unrealistic and unenforceable" 
provision.61 This is so because the lawyer must use discretion in de­
termining whether certain legislation is in the public's interest.62 
This author believes that a better provision would read: "A lawyer 
52. See infra note 54. 
53. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-8 (1979). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 192 (1939). 
57. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-101(A)(I) (1979). 
58. Id. DR 8-IOI(A)(2). 
59. In re Vasser, 75 N.J. 357, 364, 382 A.2d, 114, 117 (1978). 
60. Cady, Canons 10 Ihe Code ofProfessional Responsibility, 2 CONN. L. REV. 222 
(1969-1970). 
61. Id. at 243-44. 
62. Id. at 244. 
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who holds public office shall not use his public position for the sole 
purpose of advancing in legislative matters the selfish or special in­
terests of himself or of a client."63 
With this criticism as a starting point, we now will specifically 
deal with several of the current dilemmas that face public office 
holders who are also private attorneys. 
B. 	 Lawyer-Legislator Conflict of Interest: Informal Opinion 
118264 
A total of eight questions were posed to the committee, of which 
four will be considered. The first was, "Should a lawyer who is a 
member of a legislative body accept a retainer or other compensa­
tion from an electric utility . . . or any other organization which is 
likely to be affected by the passage or defeat of proposed 
legislation?"65 
In response, the committee found that no definitive answer 
could be given because there exists no Disciplinary Rule to prohibit 
a lawyer-legislator from representing an individual or organization 
that will likely be affected by the passage or defeat of legislation.66 
The committee did find that Disciplinary Rule 8-101(A)(3) may 
effectively proscribe the acceptance of a retainer because fact issues 
may show that an offered retainer may be made with the purpose of 
influencing the lawyer-legislator's action as a public official. The 
committee then quoted DR 8-101(A)(l), which prohibits a lawyer­
legislator from using his position to attempt to obtain a special advan
tage for himself or for a client in legislative matters where such ac­
tion is not in the public interest.67 
The terms "special advantage" and "not in the public interest" 
are not defined but a blanket prohibition was not intended because 
the committee that drafted the Code did not (although it easily could 
have) prohibit a lawyer-legislator from representing a client who is 
likely to be affected by the passage or defeat of proposed legisla­
tion.68 Further, an interpretation that constituted a blanket proscrip­
tion would leave the lawyer-legislator with very few clients whom he 
could represent. The committee construed the phrase "special ad­
63. 	 lei. 
64. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1182 
(1972). 
65. 	 lei. 
66. 	 lei. 
67. 	 lei. 
68. 	 lei. 
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vantage" to mean a direct and peculiar advantage, and "not in the 
public interest" to mean an action that is clearly inimical to the pub­
lic's interest.69 E.C. 8-870 was quoted to support the proposition that 
a lawyer should refuse a retainer if, considering all circumstances, 
the lawyer's conduct will adversely affect public confidence.71 
The commission proceeded to consider the question: "Where 
the compensation of members of administrative boards is fixed by 
the legislature, or where their appointments are subject to legislative 
approval or where they are elected by the legislature, should lawyer­
legislators appear before these administrative boards in behalf of 
private clients?"72 
The commission recognized the proscription of DR 8-101(A)(2) 
for a lawyer to use his public position to influence a tribunal to act 
either in his behalf or in favor of his client.73 Further, the Commis­
sion found that a lawyer's mere appearance before such a board may 
be circumstantial evidence of using such influence or the attempt 
thereof.74 Ultimately, this will be a question of fact that must be 
dealt with on a case by case basis. 
The commission continued with a further question: "Is it 
proper for a lawyer-legislator to accept legal employment by the 
state or by one of its agencies?"75 While no Disciplinary Rule could 
be found to prohibit a legislator from being employed in such a ca­
pacity, the commission concluded that such dual employment is 
often controlled by locallaw.76 Moreover, EC 8-4 provides that this 
type of dual employment requires the lawyer clearly to state his posi­
tion, pro or con, concerning individual legislation taken by him as a 
legislator or as a state employee.77 
Finally, the last question asked if the same rules apply to a law 
partner of the legislator-Iawyer.78 The general rule is that disqualifi­
cation of a lawyer includes disqualification of his law partners.79 It 
69. Id. 
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-8 (1979). 
71. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1182 
( 1972). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 33 
(1931), cited in Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons o.f Ethics and 
Intra-Firm Conflicts o.f Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1078 (1964). 
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was the opinion of the commission that the same rules will apply to a 
law partner of the legislator.so 
C. State Conflict-of-lnterest Legis/ation 
In 1971, Connecticut passed a conflict of interest statute, that 
was perceived as "land-mark" legislation.sl For the first time, at 
least in the New England region, a state legislature probed the 
financial holdings of its members and accepted the responsibility of 
defining proper conduct. There was one main weakness in the 1971 
statute which became apparent as other states began to pass similar 
legislation. David Ogle, Executive Director of the General Assem­
bly's Legislative Management Committee, said, "By 1977 we recog­
nized that our land-mark conflict-of-interest statute was weak and 
ineffective."s2 Thus the General Assembly amended this law so that 
financial information pertaining to all legislators was not only open 
to public inspection, but was in the hands of the members of an eth­
ics commission which was empowered to act on violations and initi­
ate sanctions. 
1. Connecticut 
Connecticut's Code of Ethics for public officials is codified in 
the Connecticut General Statutes.S3 The relevant statute provides 
that all statewide elected officials must file, under a penalty of false 
statement, a statement for the preceding year. 84 This statement must 
include the following: (1) the names of all businesses with which the 
officeholder is associated; (2) all sources of income in excess of 
$1,000, and all clients who provide over $5,000 of income; (3) the 
name of any securities which have a fair market value in excess of 
$5,000 unless the stock is held in trust established for the purpose of 
divesting the officeholder of all control and knowledge of his assets 
in order to avoid a conflict of interest; and (4) all real property and 
its location. 85 
80. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1182 
(1972). Two committee members did not participate in the opinion because of the vague­
ness of the inquiry. Id. 
81. David Ogle, Executive Director of the Legislative Management Committee of 
Connecticut's General Assembly, was the architect for much of the state's modernized 
structures and procedures. Prior to 1977, he had custody of sealed confidential informa­
tion pertaining to each legislator. Interview with David Ogle (Jan. II, 1983). 
82. Id. 
83. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-79 through 1-90 (1981). 
84. Id. § 1-83(a). 
85. Id. § 1-83(b)(\ )(A)-(D). 
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In addition, the officeholder must file with the commission a 
disclosure of any fees or honorariums received for any appearance 
or the delivery of an address before an organization or a meeting.86 
The filed statement is a matter of public information.87 Moreover, a 
public official cannot be offered or given anything of value based on 
an understanding that the official's judgment, action, or vote will be 
infl uenced. 88 
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important portion 
of the Code is the section that prohibits a public official from engag­
ing in outside activities or incurring any obligation which is in "sub­
stantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties or 
employment in the public interest and of his responsibilities as pre­
scribed in the laws of this state."89 Under this provision, no public 
official may accept other employment which will impair his or her 
independence of judgment in the role as a public official. 90 
Similar to provisions in Rhode Island General Laws,91 and a 
Rhode Island Advisory Opinion,92 Connecticut's statutes forbid a 
public official from deriving a direct monetary gain or suffering a 
direct monetary loss because of official activity.93 The procedures 
required for a public official when a discharge of the duty affects his 
or her financial interests are nearly identical in Connecticut and 
Rhode Island.94 
Upon finding a violation of the Connecticut statutes, the com­
mission is empowered to order the violator to do any or all of the 
following: "(1) cease and desist the violation; (2) file any report, 
statement or other information as required by the statute; and 
(3) pay a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars for 
each violation of the statute."95 
Moreover, one who intentionally violates any provision of the 
statute will be imprisoned for a term not to exceed one year or fined 
a sum not to exceed $1,000.96 Finally, the penalties prescribed limit 
neither the power of the legislature to impeach or discipline public 
86. Id § 1-83(b)(2). 
87. Id § 1-83(c). 
88. Id § 1-84(1). 
89. Id § 1-84(a). 
90. Id § 1-84(b). 
91. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-6 (Supp. 1982). 
92. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 77-9 (April 19, 1977). 
93. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-85 (1981). 
94. Id § 1-86 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §36-14-5 (Supp. 1982). 
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-88(a) (1981). 
96. Id § 1-89(a). 
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officials nor the power of any agency or commission to discipline its 
. own employees or officials.97 
2. Rhode Island 
In 1977, the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
followed Connecticut's lead and passed what was considered a 
"strong" conflict-of-interest statute.98 However, unlike Connecticut, 
where a state's attorney has prosecuted a lawyer-legislator for ethical 
and criminal violations, Rhode Island's Conflict-of-Interest Com­
mission "has not received any conflict-of-interest complaints regard­
ing attorneys misusing their public office for personal gain."99 This 
means the Rhode Island statute has never been tested in an actual 
court case. This is not to imply, however, that the commission has 
been inactive during the period from 1977 to the present. In addi­
tion to issuing over 700 advisory opinions on questions raised by 
candidates and elected officials, some of whom were . lawyers, the 
commission has processed 123 complaints related to failure to file 
required information (only one involved a lawyer-politician).lOo 
Because Rhode Island's conflict-of-interest law so closely resem­
bles the Connecticut statute, it does not merit further analysis. Bet­
ter insights can be gained by reviewing selected advisory opinions 
issued by the commission. 
(a) Advisory Opinion 81-13 101 
Representative A is both a member of the State House of Rep­
resentatives and is an attorney. He learned that he may be able to 
serve as counsel for the Bay Commission, an incorporated state au­
thority. Representative A had introduced a bill requiring the Bay 
Commission to have its rates reviewed by the Public Utilities Com­
mission before being asked to perform legal services. 102 The com­
mission considered the question whether the attorney-representative 
can provide legal services to the Bay Commission. l03 
97. Id § 1-89(b). 
98. R.t. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-8(k) (Supp. 1982). Telephone interviews with David 
Ogle and members of Rhode Island's Conflict-of-Interest Commission (Jan. 1983). 
99. Letter from Gerald A. Slattery, Conflict-of-Interest Commission, to Clyde D. 
McKee, Jr. (October 8, 1982). 
100. Telephone interview with research assistant at Conflict-of-Interest Commis­
sion (J an. 1983). 
101. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-13 (Apr. 23, 
1981). 
102. Id 
103. Id 
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In its advisory opinion, the commission determined that repre­
sentative A may perform legal services for the Bay Comm~ssion so 
long as he does not vote on or influence directly or indirectly any 
General Assembly matters which specifically affect the Bay Commis­
sion. I04 Since under House Rules, the sponsor of legislation must 
request that the bill be brought up for consideration and vote, Rep­
resentative A may make this request. Finally, Representative A's 
partners should avoid all activities from which Representative A 
himself is prohibited. lOS 
(b) Advisory Opinion 81-9106 
Representative B is an associate on salary with a law firm. She 
does not share in the profits or expenses. She is a candidate for the 
City Council but now must anticipate how her law firm and practice 
will be affected. The law firm appears before the City Zoning Board 
often and occasional appearances are made before the City Council 
for liquor license applications, transfers, and zoning amendments. 107 
The commission examined the consequences of her election. 
Here, the commission ruled that if Attorney B is elected, any 
firm member appearing before the City Council would be in viola­
tion of Rhode Island General Laws l08 even if B disqualifies herself 
from participation. lo9 The firm may appear before other municipal 
agencies provided that: (1) B does not participate in or vote on any 
matter before the Town Council in which she or any firm member 
has been personally involved; and (2) B abstains from any matter 
before the Town Council involving municipal agencies in which she, 
or any firm member, continues to practice after B is elected. I 10 Fi­
nally, B is advised that if elected, she should request advice as indi­
vidual situations arise since all potential conflicts cannot be 
anticipated. III 
104. Id 
105. Id 
106. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Ope 81-9 (Feb. 18, 
1981). 
107. Id 
108. R.l. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-4(e)(l) (Supp. 1982). 
109. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-9 (Feb. 18, 
1981). 
110. Id 
111. ld 
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(c) Advisory Opinion 81-2 as Amended I 12 
Attorney C is a partner in a law firm and his law partner is 
Chairman of the City Board of Public Safety. C has been appointed 
Labor Relations Administrator by the Mayor. His duties include ne­
gotIating collective bargaining agreements for the city's uniformed 
police officers. As a private attorney, C has been asked by a long­
standing client to represent her in an action brought by the city po­
lice. He has agreed to represent her on a pro bono basis. 113 The 
issue addressed was whether this agreement was in violation of the 
Code,ll4 
It was the commission's opinion that C may represent his client 
without violating the conflict-of-interest law although the commis­
sion noted that an appearance of impropriety within the meaning of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility,115 may arise. I 16 
(d)· Advisory Opinion 79-73(a) and 79-73(b)117 
Representative D practices part-time in a law firm and she is 
paid on an hourly basis. A partner in the firm is a candidate for a 
State Supreme Court vacancy, which will be filled by the General 
Assembly. Can D support, campaign or vote for the partner? I 18 
The commission found that Representative D may vote or make 
a supporting statement for the partner and may actively campaign 
for him without violating the conflict-of-interest law. 119 
(e) Advisory Opinion 79-8 120 
E is a member of the Finance Committee of the City Council. 
He is a partner in a law firm that often represents a company that. 
now seeks approval from the Finance Committee of an agreement 
between the company and city relating to tax payments, litigation 
and real estate. The company has retained another firm with which 
112. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-2 as amended 
(Feb. 26, 1981). 
113. Id 
114. Id 
115. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980). 
116. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-2 as amended 
(Feb. 26, 1981). 
117. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 79-73(a), (b) (Sept. 
17, 1979). 
118. Id 
119. Id 
120. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 79-8 (March 8, 
1979). 
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E has no connection. 121 The commission considered what would be 
appropriate conduct for E. 
In this situation, the commission decided that E must abstain 
from discussing, voting on, or participating in any way on the agree­
ment in order to avoid a potential conflict of interest under Rhode 
Island General Laws. 122 
(f) Advisory Opinion 78-92 and 78-95 123 
Attorney General-elect F owns 100 shares of a Rhode Island 
Public Utility stock. As Attorney General, F will be the legal advi­
sor to the Public Utilities Division, which regulates the company. 124 
The commission considered what F should do to avoid a conflict of 
interest. 125 
The Conflict-of-Interest Commission found that it had no pres­
ent authority to order divestiture of the stock owned by F. The com­
mission did state that a potential conflict of interest would be 
actualized when F assumed the office of Attorney General. Thus he 
should either divest himself of the stock or place it in a qualified 
blind trust as defined in federal statutes. 126 
(g) Advisory Opinion 78-7127 
G is a member of the Town Council. The council appoints the 
Town Probate Judge. G, in his role as an attorney, represents an 
estate presently pending before the Probate Court. Does this situa­
tion present a conflict of interest? 128 
No conflict of interest was found to exist because the Probate 
Judge's term is concurrent with that of the council and Councilman 
G will have no opportunity to vote on the present Probate Judge's 
position. 129 
121. fd 
122. fd See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-4 (Supp. 1982). 
123. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 78-92 & 78-95 (Jan. 
22, 1979). 
124. fd 
125. fd 
12(i. fd The applicable federal statute which covers the qualified blind trust is the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1828 (codified at 2 U.S.c. 
§ 702(e)(3) (Supp. V 1981». 
127. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 78-7 (Apr. 25, 
1978). 
128. fd 
129. fd 
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(h) Advisory Opinion 77-9 130 
House Speaker H is in a law firm in which one of the partners 
represents city school committees. Legislation will ultimately come 
before the House wherein H must vote upon issues dealing with pub­
lic school teachers, teachers' unions, and other matters of vital and 
monetary concern to the school committees. 13 I 
The commission found that a potential conflict of interest exists 
under Rhode Island General Laws when legislation comes before H 
or any committee on which he serves, that can cause direct monetary 
gain or loss to H, his partners or firm, and result in a benefit or detri­
ment to H, his firm or law partners. 132 Under state law,133 therefore, 
H is required to: (1) file a sworn statement describing the matter to 
the Conflict-of-Interest Commission; (2) deliver a copy of the state­
ment to the person who presides over the House in H's absence; 
(3) record the statement in the House Journal; and (4) request to be 
excused from voting on the matter on which the potential conflict 
exists. 134 
3. Massachusetts 
(a) State Statutes 
In 1962, Massachusetts passed a short conflict-of-interest statute 
that had three provisions. 135 First, it restricted state and county em­
ployees from receiving directly or indirectly, or requesting compen­
sation from anyone outside the government for a matter in which the 
government was a party or had "a direct and substantial interest." 136 
Second, it made it a crime for anyone to give or promise compensa­
tion to a government official to exercise influence. 137 Third, it ex­
pressly restricted state-employed attorneys from representing clients 
with claims against the government. 138 The penalty for violating 
these requirements was not to exceed a fine of $3,000 or a prison 
term of two years, or both.139 This statute was revised in 1978, im­
130. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 77-9 (Apr. 19, 
1977). 
13\. Id 
132. Id; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-6 (Supp. 1982). 
133. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-5. 
134. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 79-9 (Apr. 19, 
1977). 
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 1-25 (West 1970). 
136. Id § II(a). 
137. Id § II(b). 
138. Id § II(c). 
139. Id 
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posing restrictions on legal partners of lawyers in the employment of 
the Commonwealth. 140 It also imposed a one-year restriction on 
lawyer-legislators from acting as "legislative agents" for parties 
outside the government under threat of fine and imprisonment. 141 
Added insights into the legal theory of the Commonwealth's 
conflict-of-interest laws can be gained by reviewing the following ad­
visory opinion. 
(b) Advisory Opinion 82-6 142 
The committee considered the following situation. A legislator 
(L) wants to practice law part-time with two friends. The proposed 
firm would attract clients whose needs would require the firm to go 
before federal, state, and local administrative authorities. The law­
yers would be appearing in settings for formal adjudication, rule­
making, and negotiations for permits and licenses. L wants to know 
what his limitations are as a lawyer-Iegislator. 143 
The committee determined that the lawyer would not be sub­
jected to duties to the Commonwealth under Canons 4 and 5. 144 De­
spite this, it may give rise to fiduciary duties to the commonwealth 
which may be compromised by his representation of private con­
cerns against the Commonwealth. The committee provided that 
such fiduciary duties are matters of substantive law which it cannot 
address. 145 Similarly, the committee determined that application of 
Massachusetts statutes146 to a public official's representation of pri­
vate clients is equally beyond its purview. 147 
The committee did find Massachusetts law 148 imposing stringent 
restrictions upon a legislator's legal representation of private individ­
uals in front of state agencies when the legislator is being compen­
140. Id § 5(d)( Supp. 1980). 
141. Id § 5(e) (Supp. 1980). 
142. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6, 
1982). It should be understood that this opinion is not a state ethics ruling, but an 
advisory opinion by the committee of a voluntary association. 
143. Id 
144. Id Canon 4 states: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of 
a client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1979). Canon 5 
states: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a cli­
ent." Id Canon 5. 
145. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6, 
1982). 
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 1-25 (West 1970). 
147. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6, 
1982). 
148. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 4 (West 1970). 
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sated. 149 Moreover, the State Ethics Commission has proposed to 
amend the state statute to further restrict such representation. 150 
The committee then found that DR 8-101(A)(2)151 would be ap­
plicable in situations in which the lawyer goes before certain federal 
and local governmental entities. 152 This was interpreted as a viola­
tion only when the lawyer uses his influence, as opposed to using his 
public position per se. 153 The committee found that DR 9-101(c)154 
wmild prohibit a lawyer from stating or implying that he is able to 
influence the action of any entity of government in an improper 
manner. 155 Finally, the committee stated that the lawyer-legislator's 
partners would not be barred from practicing in front of governmen­
tal agencies. 156 While such partners obviously could not state or im­
ply that they may be able to influence the agency because of their 
partnership with the lawyer-legislator, this does not mean that 'a total 
bar is appropriate. 157 The committee warned, however, that the law­
yer-legislator cannot be involved in a matter engaged in by one of 
his partners, if the legislator himself could not handle it personally; 
nor may the legislator's compensation be affected by the firm's han­
dling of the matter. 15S 
IV. 	 THE CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL AND STATE CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST LEGISLATION AND ADVISORY OPINIONS 
What have been the consequences of the national and state re­
form movements initiated during the past two decades? Are fewer 
lawyers running for public office, particularly legislative seats at the 
state and local levels? If so, are legislatures becoming more repre­
sentative of the general population? To what extent has the adop­
tion of stringent conflict-of-interest statutes influenced the policies of 
major law firms? How have these statutes influenced the behavior of 
149. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6, 
1982). 
ISO. Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8, 1982, at I, col. I. 

lSI. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-IOI(A)(2) (1979). 

152. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6, 
1982). 
153. Id 
154. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-IOI(c) (1979). 
ISS. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6, 
1982). 
156. Id 
157. Id 
158. Id 
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lawyer-politicians who are serving in state and local legislatures? 
Are additional reforms necessary? 
Occupational surveys showing the percentages of lawyers serv­
ing in state legislatures have been compiled by organiz~tions suc~ as 
the Insurance Information Institute (1.1.1.).159 This institute's occu­
pational survey for the New England region is reproduced in Appen­
dix A. Similar national information was first compiled in 1966, 
facilitating a framework for the analysis of the impact of conflict-of­
interest legislation. The Institute's findings concerning the role of 
lawyers are summarized below. 
A. Entire United States: Comparison of1979 with Previous Years 
Generally, representation by lawyers in the state legislatures 
across the nation is continuing to decline, and the percentage of state 
lawmakers from the field of education is on the rise. 160 The latest 
survey, in 1979, shows that lawyers hold 20% of the state legislative 
seats countrywide, down from 21% in 1977 and 22% in 1976. This 
represents a decrease of 106 seats since 1977; 188 seats since 1976. 161 
In 1966, when the I.I.I. first conducted an occupational study, 26% of 
all state lawmakers were lawyers. 162 
B. Major Regional Areas 
The percentage of state legislators who are also attorneys is 
down in each of the nation's four major geographical areas. Only in 
the South does the percentage (29%) exceed that for the total U.S. 
Virginia has the highest percentage of lawyer-legislators (53%) of 
any state. At the other end of the spectrum, Delaware has the only 
legislature with no lawyers among its members. Lawyers hold 30% 
or more of the legislative seats in each of 7 states; in 1977, it was 11. 
On the other hand, the number of states in which lawyers hold 15% 
or fewer of the legislative seats now stands at 20, up from 18 in 
1977. 163 
159. See, e.g., INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (1979). 
160. See infra Appendix A. 

16\. Id. 

162. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES 8 (1979). 
163. See page 69\. 
691 1983) LAWYER-POLITICIANS IN NEW ENGLAND 
C. 	 The New England Region: Comparison of1979 with Previous 
Years 
In 1979, in each of the three urban-industrial states in New Eng­
land, more than 1 of every 5 legislators were lawyers: Massachusetts, 
25%; Rhode Island, 23%; and Connecticut, 21%. By contrast, in the 
three rural New England states, fewer than 1 of 10 state legislators 
were attorneys: Maine, 9%; Vermont, 8%; and New Hampshire, 
3%.164 
D. 	 Implications 
This information supports the hypothesis that conflict-of-inter­
est statutes initiated at the national and state levels during the past 
REPRESENTATION BY LAWYERS, INSURANCE PEOPLE AND EDUCATORS, 
1979, 1977 AND 1976 
- TOTAL U.S. ­
Total U.S. Northeast North Central South West 
La~ers 
1979 20% 17% 16% 29% 12% 
1977 21% 18% 17% 31% 13% 
1976 22% 19% 18% 32% 14% 
Id. 
164. 
REPRESENTATION 	BY LAWYERS, INSURANCE PEOPLE AND EDUCATORS, 
1979, 1977 AND 1976 
- NEW ENGLAND ­
Regional 
Total Conn. Maine Mass. N.H. R.I. Vt. 
La~ers 
1979 12% 21% 9% 25% 3% 23% 8% 
1977 12% 19% 6% 24% 2% 24% 8% 
1976 13% 23% 7% 24% 2% 27% 8% 
REPRESENTATION BY LAWYERS, INSURANCE PEOPLE AND EDUCATORS 
IN 1979, SENATES AND HOUSES 
- NEW ENGLAND ­
Regional 
Total Conn. Maine Mass. N.H. R.I. Vt. 
La~ers 
Senate 25% 47% 9% 35% 4% 26% 20% 
House 10% 15% 9% 22% 2% 22% 5% 
Id. at 12. 
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two decades may be causal factors in discouraging lawyers from 
service in state legislatures. As the percentages of attorneys declined, 
the percentages of other groups (educators, women, minorities, etc.) 
have increased, making legislatures more representative of the gen­
eral population. 165 
The three-year survey of percentages of attorneys in the New 
England states suggest that this region has a trend that runs counter 
to the trend of the nation. Over this three-year period, the percent­
age for the New England region declined only a single point. 166 
There were ·actual increases in the percentages of attorneys serving in 
four of the six states between 1977 and 1979. 167 Only in Rhode Is­
land has there been a steady decline, while the percentage of lawyer­
legislators in Vermont remained a constant 8%.168 But more impor­
tant than these small deviations is the glaring fact that in three states 
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) each legislature has 
more than one-fifth lawyer-legislators while in the remaining three 
states (Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) each has less than 
one-tenth lawyer-legislators. 169 A possible explanation may be that 
the high-percentage states tend to be "commuter-legislator" states. 
However, one lawyer, who practices in Vermont and teaches at the 
University of Connecticut, said, "We have higher legal standards in 
Vermont than in Connecticut. We would not tolerate what goes on 
in the Connecticut Probate Courts." 170 This statement suggests there 
may be significant differences in the political cultures of the more 
rural states which affect the incentive-rewards systems of their law­
yer-politicians. 
V. DIVERSITY OF POLICY IN LAW FIRMS FOR 

LAWYER- POLITICIANS 

Law firms in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts can 
be grouped into six major categories. First, there are the large law 
firms located in capital cities. These firms are primarily interested in 
the practice of law and will not allow any of their members to serve 
as state representatives. Second, there are large law firms that facili­
165. Id 
166. Id at 9. 
167. These increases occurred in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire. See supra note 164. 
168. Rhode Island declined from 27% to 23% between 1976 and 1979. Vermont 
remained steady at 8%. Id 
169. Id 
170. See supra note 16. 
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tate, if not encourage, their members to seek elected statewide execu­
tive offices and national appointments. They allow their lawyer­
politicians to take leaves of absence and remain associated with the 
firm, providing a "castle" to which the lawyer-politicians can return 
if oefeated or retired. Third, there are smaller law firms, located 
outside the capital regions which do not object to their members 
serving in the state legislature or in other elected and appointed posi­
tions. Fourth, there are small firms which encourage their members 
to seek positions on partisan committees, town councils, and to serve 
as town counselor judges of probate. Fifth, there are firms which 
facilitate if not encourage their members to take active roles in such 
partisan activities as fundraising and campaigns but prohibit their 
holding of elected or appointed office. Finally, there is the "political 
law firm."171 
In Connecticut, at least, "political law firms" are offices com­
posed of prominent ex-political officials. They have held leadership 
positions and run for public office. Democrats and Republicans oc­
cupy these law offices which are designed to provide high class state 
lobbying services for affluent corporations and interest groups. 
There are such firms in Connecticut which exercise substantial polit­
ical influence at the national, state, or local levels. 172 
At the other end of the spectrum are those law firms not inter­
ested in having their members participate in politics. Law students 
at Harvard are instructed on how to approach many of the Boston 
firms: "Tell the representatives of these firms that you have always 
wanted to work for their particular firm, that you only want to prac­
tice law, and that you want to spend your entire career with 
them."173 The theory for this advice is that the senior partners in 
these firms see their organizations strictly as business enterprises 
designed to make money rather than serving the public's interest by 
participating in the political process. 174 
Some large law firms in Connecticut try to strike a more bal­
anced position. While they have restrictions on members serving in 
the state legislature because they represent major clients regulated by 
state agencies, they will facilitate the election of members of the firm 
to the office of mayor or city council even though service in these 
positions costs the firm thousands of dollars in legal fees from clients 
171. Id 
172. Id 
173. This information was supplied by a recent Harvard Law School graduate, 
who was hired by a Boston firm. Id 
174. Id 
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with zoning and tax problems. One senior partner in such. a firm 
explained that there was a need for his firm to have an enlightened 
and expansive concept of social and civic responsibility. He also 
said conflict-of-interest statutes, advisory opinions of the bar associa­
tions, and the threat of perceived ethical and legal conflicts are a 
constant source of frustration in the firm's practice of law. 175 
Rhode Island has few, if any, large law firms which can equal 
the size of those in Massachusetts or Connecticut. Although Rhode 
Island has a strict conflict-of-interest statute, there is a general per­
ception by both lawyers and non-lawyers that this law imposes few 
restrictions on lawyer-politicians, who wish to serve as public or 
elected officials.I76 The fact that there have been no official com­
plaints involving lawyer-politicians supports this generalization. 
VI. QUESTIONS, ISSUES, AND GUIDELINES FOR 

FURTHER REFORMS 

A. Recent Changes 
In February 1982, the Massachusetts State Ethics Commission 
announced that it was proposing "a comprehensive legislative pack­
age" to amend the state conflict-of-interest law (Chapter 268A).177 
Similarly, in Connecticut, the state's legislative Codes of Ethics 
Study Committee announced in January 1983 that it was going to 
recommend "tighter state codes."17s 
In both states there is general agreement among lawyers, mem­
bers of the press, and those who administer the conflict-of-interest 
statutes that their law is "basically sound."179 The Massachusetts 
State Ethics Commission saw the need, however, to loosen the re­
strictions against "special" public employees and state legislators 
"from receiving compensation for appearing before quasi-judicial 
proceedings of state agencies," particularly the Industrial Accident 
Board. lso Connecticut's Code of Ethics Study Committee was cre­
ated in 1982 after a scandal involving a dozen legislators, who were 
175. Id 
176. Id 
177. Conjlicl Amendmenrs Proposed, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8, 1982, 
at I, col. 4. 
178. Elhics Panel Asks Tighler Slale Codes, The Hartford Courant, Jan. 18, 1983, 
at 13. 
179. Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8, 1982, at I, col. 4. 
180. Id 
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treated to a weekend on Cape Code by a lobbyist for a dog track.I 81 
There is strong sentiment in Connecticut that more top govern­
ment policy makers should be required to wait at least a year before 
taking jobs with businesses they have regulated. 182 One recommen­
dation calls for lobbyists to be required to report campaign contribu­
tions exceeding $50.00. 183 Another would require lobbyists to 
disclose the names of any officials they employ.184 There is also a 
provision that calls for the Ethics Commission to be given the au­
thority to refuse to accept, for a period of two years, the registration 
of any lobbyist found guilty of "a serious, intentional, violation of 
the ethics law."185 
B. Unanswered Questions 
There are other issues that law-makers and political leaders in 
the New England states may want to consider. First, to what extent 
should the structures, requirements, and procedures of government 
be designed to facilitate public service by lawyers as elected and ap­
pointed officials? Second, there is a need to recognize that the be­
havior of lawyers is now regulated by state statutes, rulings of the 
ethics commissions, advisory opinions of bar associations, the inter­
nal policies oflaw firms, and the character and ethical values of indi­
vidual practitioners. Which of these should have primary 
responsibility for maintaining high standards of legal conduct? 
Third, is the public better served by part-time, citizen-politicians, 
some of whom are lawyers, or should the system be changed to at­
tract only those persons interested in becoming full-time profession­
als; whether' they be local judges, city solicitors, city councilmen, 
state prosecutors, state legislators, state's attorney generals, or gover­
nors? Fourth, when conflicts of interest arise, how should they be 
handled? Should these issues be raised by opposing counsel, by fel­
low members of commissions, boards, committees, and legislative 
bodies, or by the lawyer directly involved? Who should decide if an 
actual conflict exists: the attorney general and city solicitor; other 
members of the political body; or the lawyer himself? Fifth, when a 
lawyer-politician is guilty of a serious and intentional conflict of in­
terest, who should have primary responsibility for punishment: the 
181. Interview with Charles Morse. Political Reporter for The Hartford Courant 
(Jan. II, 1983). 
182. The Hartford Courant, Jan. 18, 1983, at 13. 
183. Id 
184. Id 
185. Id 
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political party; the political body to which the member belongs; the 
bar association; the state licensing board; or the press and media? 
C. Implementation of Solutions 
There are a variety of structural options, salary incentives, for­
mal and informal rewards, election provisions, and in-house rules 
that can be used to implement answers to the general questions. 
Space limitations will permit discussion of only several of these 
alternatives. 
At the local level many lawyer-politicians are discouraged from 
running for seats on the city council due to potential conflicts of in­
terest. When city councils have authority to rule on zoning issues, 
appeals from tax requirements, and suits against the municipality, all 
the members of the councilman's law firm are prohibited from repre­
senting clients with problems in these areas. 186 The city charter can 
be changed to empower the city council to decentralize and delegate 
its authority to remove potential conflicts of interest. Special atten­
tion can be given to the office of director of law or city solicitor. If 
this official is a full-time, permanent employee, with authority to act 
on suits against the city, then potential conflicts of interest for law­
yer-councilmen are reduced significantly. 
Similarly, if lawyers are appointed by the chief executives to 
commissions, boards, and committees rather than elected or ap­
pointed by the city council, the number of potential conflicts can be 
reduced for both the councilman and the appointed attorney. In 
general, there is a need for members of charter commissions to see 
governmental structures and procedures as incentives-rewards sys­
tems, which have a direct influence on attracting or discouraging 
lawyer-politicians. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is an enduring affinity between the practice of law and 
the practice of politics in America. There are also enduring issues 
and problems of actual and perceived conflicts of interest for lawyer­
politicians. During the past two decades the American Bar Associa­
tion' state legislatures, and ethics commissions have initiated a vari­
ety of restrictions to check unacceptable behavior by legislators, 
lobbyists, and permanent employees. There appears to be a national 
relationship between the introduction of these restrictions and a de­
186. See supra note 16. 
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cline in the numbers of lawyer-legislators. The New England region 
provides an interesting and challenging environment to study the op­
portunities, incentives-rewards, and conflict-of-interest problems of 
lawyer-politicians. Although there are a variety of proposals for 
modifying existing conflict-of-interest statutes, many of the funda­
mental issues affecting lawyers who want to participate in public 
service have yet to be adequately addressed. Once they are ad­
dressed, the political institutions at the state and local levels lend 
themselves to a variety of options and alternatives for facilitating the 
compatible practice of law and politics. 
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APPENDIX A 
NEW ENGLAND 
REGION 
OCCUPATIONS OF STATE LEGISLATORSI87 
(Percentages by State) 
Regional 
Total Conn. Maine Mass. N.H. R.I. VI. 
NUMBER OF LEGISLATORS 1,325 187 184 200 424 150 180 
% % % % % % % 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY 
Lawyer 12% 21% 9% 25% 3% 23% 8% 
Other Professionals 8 6 5 7 12 7 7 
Insurance 6 7 4 7 4 9 6 
Entrepreneur/Self-Employed 17 14 22 13 16 21 \3 
Business Executive/Managerial 6 9 5 3 5 4 9 
Real Estate/Construction 8 4 12 5 \0 8 8 
Agriculture 5 2 9 4 16 
Communications/Arts 3 3 I 5 3 
Other Business Occupations II 6 19 5 14 6 10 
Education \0 9 7 13 8 14 13 
Government Employees 
Non-Profit Organizations 
Labor Union 
6 
I 
5 
3 
3 
I 
\0 
I 
I 
\0 
• 
• 
4 
Homemaker/Student 
Information Not Available 
6 
I 
6 
5 
3 9 9 
• 
5 
I 
2 
• Less than \2 of 1%. 
187. INSURANCE iNFORMATION INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES 43 (1979). 
